IP spoofing enables reflection and amplification attacks, which cause major threats to the current Internet infrastructure. Detecting IP packets with incorrect source addresses would help to improve the situation. This is easy at the attacker's network, but very challenging at Internet eXchange Points (IXPs) or in transit networks. In this reproducibility study, we revisit the paper Detection, Classification, and Analysis of Inter-Domain Traffic with Spoofed Source IP Addresses published at ACM IMC 2017 [8] . Using data from a different IXP and from a different time, we were not able to reproduce the results. Unfortunately, our analysis shows that the current state of art does introduce a methodology that does not comply with common real-world deployment.
INTRODUCTION
IP spoofing injects packets that include an IP source address, which is not advertised to the routing by its origin network. Consequently, any reply is directed not to its origin but to a different destination. In combination with a distributed amplification, in which small requests trigger much larger replies, this leads to serious denial of service attacks in the current Internet [7, 14] .
The most effective mitigation of reflection attacks [14] is ingress filtering at the network of the attacker [2, 5] . This solution, however, is not sufficiently deployed [6] . An alternative solution [8] proposes a heuristic at central Internet eXchange Points (IXPs) following the observation that a valid packet should flow compliant with control plane information, and hence should reach the IXP via a customer cone that contains its origin. This paper recently published at ACM IMC 2017 claims that a method is presented "to passively detect packets with spoofed IP addresses [...] and minimize false positive inferences" [8, § 1] . Central to this approach is a reliable inference of customer cones from BGP data, which poses the major challenge.
In this paper, we report on our attempts to reproduce the current state of the art, based on a different team and setup [1] . At different times, we analyze data from a large regional IXP instead of data from a large European IXP, which should not affect the validity of the method. Unfortunately, our findings largely differ from those presented in IMC'17, even though we explore various ways of inferring the customer cones. In particular, spoofed traffic classified in our experiments exceeds the values of IMC'17 by orders of magnitude with a traffic mix that strongly indicates a dominant portion of false positives. We identify plausible reasons for these discrepancies from further analyses. It is worth noting that our insights are independent of the vantage point and time but highlight intrinsic drawbacks of the previous methodology. Later research [11] will confirm our results.
In the remainder, we recap the methodology in Section 2, introduce our implementation and data sources in Section 3, present and discuss results in Section 4, and conclude in Section 5.
RECAP OF IMC'17 METHODOLOGY
The objective of the proposed approach [8] is to sort invalid (spoofed) traffic from regular (non-spoofed). Before classifying packets into theses two categories the traffic is sanitized by filtering bogon packets, i.e., packets with addresses from private networks and other ineligible routable prefixes [4, 13, 16] , as well as unrouted packets, i.e., packets from sources that do not show any announcements.
For the remaining packets entering the IXP via an IXP member, a check is required whether each packet arrives via a customer cone that covers the prefix of the origin AS. Such a customer cone includes all ASes that receive (indirect) upstream via the IXP member and includes transitive peering.
Due to the limited visibility of BGP relations and the lack of vantage points, it is a major challenge to correctly infer these cones. Three approaches are proposed in [8] (names taken from the paper):
(1) Naive Approach. Built from public BGP information, this approach considers a packet valid if it originates from an AS that is part of an announced path for its source prefix. It aims to reflect the topology but falls short in representing business relationships between ASes accurately. Live data provides sufficient information to deploy it.
(2) CAIDA Customer Cone. In contrast to the naive cone, CAIDA represents the business relationships rather than the topology. It is created by information such as community strings, directly reported relations, and historic information. Further details are available arXiv:1911.05164v1 [cs.NI] 12 Nov 2019 00:00 00:00 00:00 00:00 00:00 00:00 00:00 00:00 12:00 12:00 12:00 12:00 12:00 12:00 12:00 Time (a) Naive Approach 00:00 00:00 00:00 00:00 00:00 00:00 00:00 00:00 12:00 12:00 12:00 12:00 12:00 12:00 12:00 Time 00:00 00:00 00:00 00:00 00:00 00:00 00:00 00:00 12:00 12:00 12:00 12:00 12:00 12:00 12:00 Time (3) Full Cone. This extended cone is built from the assumption that ASes neighboring in an announcement are tranistively peering. Built from public BGP announcements this approach adds transitive relationships between all peers. Even though this might misinterprete or miss business relationships it results in the largest cone.
Multi-AS Organization Extension:. This add-on can be combined with the CAIDA Customer Cone and the Full Cone. It adds information about sibling ASes by building connections between ASes belonging to the same multi-AS organization [3] , thus allowing a bidirectional data exchange between them.
Using these three cones packets can be classified either as invalid (spoofed) or as regular. The full cone approach is the main method examined in the IMC'17 paper and the basis for most of its evaluation. In our reproducibility study, we consider the various approaches of cone construction and analyse its different impacts on the packet classification.
IMPLEMENTION AND DATA SOURCES
Software. This study performed replicability and reproducibility work in two phases. First, we replicated the results by applying scripts kindly provided by the IMC'17 authors [9] to our data sets. These scripts supported constructing the full cone from BGP data, which is taken as the indicator of invalid packets. We augmented these scripts with helper tools for (i) reading output from tool bgpdump, and (ii) detecting bogon and unrouted packets. This step served as baseline to verify that our data can be processed as expected. All further results in this paper are based on the second phase, the reproduction.
For the reproduction, we re-implemented all methods to construct all cones (i.e., Naive, CAIDA, and Full cone) and to detect bogon and unrouted packets. Based on this reimplementation, we added enhanced features for classifying payloads of spoofed traffic using libpcap 1 . While carefully confirming consistency with the original scripts, our extended toolset allowed for a more accurate 1 https://www.tcpdump.org/ analysis of the classification, as discussed later in more detail. The software is available at https://github.com/inetrg/reproducibility-study-ixp-spoofing. Data sources. Our traffic analysis is based on sampled flow data from a large regional Internet Exchange Point in Europe. We consider two different time periods, February 19-25, 2018 and June 1-7, 2019. All results shown in this paper are based on the week in Februrary 2018, while we used the June 2019 data to verify the stability of our results.
To construct the cones and to identify unrouted prefixes, we utilize BGP data from all route collectors available in BGPStream [12] , for the corresponding weeks as well as one day before and one day after.
RESULTS
We show a first glance of the overall results in Table 1 . Our results resemble those of IMC'17 for the amount of invalids based on the naive and CAIDA cones but diverge significantly for invalids based on the full cone and the classification of bogon and unrouted traffic.
It is worth noting that the method of classifying bogon and unrouted traffic is well-known and not specific to the IMC'17 proposal. Observed divergences are not surprising but rather reflect different states of deployment in time and place. For example, as bogon The decline of invalids in the full cone, however, do surprise. IMC'17 finds 20 times less invalid bytes after extending the CAIDA cone with additional peering links, whereas we see only a reduction to more than one fifth. Similarly, packet numbers drop for IMC'17 down to one tenth, while ours decrease by a factor of three. The largely enhanced impact of the IMC'17 full cone leads to a notable reduction of traffic classified as invalid. Neither by adding (fairly effectless) multi-AS organisation extensions (see Section 2), nor by varying input data sets, we could reproduce these strong effects.
In the remainder of this section, we will analyze the invalid traffic and the impact of cone construction in more detail. Figure 1 displays the underlying time series of classified traffic for the different cone types. Absolute numbers have been rescaled by a common factor to fit the IMC'17 range. Corresponding results from IMC'17, which are only available for the full cone approach, are indicated by the shaded regions.
Discrepancies for Invalid Traffic
It is clearly visible that the different, stepwise increasing of cones enfold a moderate impact on the traffic fraction that is classified as invalid. Packet numbers marked as invalid drop less than one order of magnitude when moving from the naive to the full cone approach. This is in contrast to the IMC'17 results, which show invalids of almost two orders of magnitude less than our results for the full cone.
We compare the fractions of anomalous traffic as contributed from the IXP members in Figure 2 . A large group of IXP members issue only a very small portion of invalid packets-some of which disappearing for the full cone approach. Still no member has more than 1% of its traffic classified as either bogon, unrouted, or invalid. This is in strong contrast to the results of IMC'17, where a few members emit close to 100 % of their entire traffic to invalid, i.e., almost all traffic of these ASes is identified as spoofed.
Given these significant discrepancies between our reproduced results and IMC'17 for the fraction and the distribution of traffic classified as invalid, we question the correctness of classification by taking a closer look at the invalid packets.
First, we inspect the observed packet sizes per category. Considering that spoofed packets are often used for amplification attacks, a larger amount of small invalid packets would be in support of the classification results. Figure 3 shows the packet size distributions.
All three approaches exhibit a similar distribution of regular packet sizes with most packets larger than 1200 bytes. In contrast, bogon and unrouted traffic is overwhelmingly made up of small packets. Invalid packets tend to be smaller but vary between the approaches. Still sizes of invalid packets show a wide distribution with significant portions of large packets. This again is in contrast to the IMC'17 results, which show a sharp cut-off for packet sizes larger than ≈ 900 Bytes.
Traffic Mix Reveals False Positives
We are now diving deeper into packet inspection of the traffic classified as invalid and want to understand its characteristics. Table 2 explores the traffic mix and lists the top destination port distributions of invalid UDP and TCP packets. We cannot equivalently compare to the IMC'17 results, as their traffic mix has not fully been disclosed. Strikingly, we find the majority of invalid traffic to be HTTPS over TCP followed by Quick over UDP, and plain HTTP according to the transport ports. Typical amplification/reflection attack patterns such as DNS (UDP 53) and NTP (UDP 123) do not stand out in our data, even though they were reported to dominate in the IMC'17 results. On the overall, almost 80 % of TCP traffic raises doubts about its spoofed nature. Rather, this strongly indicates that the traffic classified as invalid from our data set mainly consists of regular Web flows and hence has been classified erroneously based on the previously proposed methodology.
As a further attempt to assess the invalid traffic as classified from our full cone approach, we test for specific indicators of unspoofed traffic. We selected the five indicators (1) SSL over TCP, (2) HTTP responses, (3) ICMP echo replies, (4) TCP packets carrying ACKs, and (5) malformed packets (e.g., transport port 0) as used by CAIDA. These indicators are not rigorous, but strong. Injecting packets into existing TCP connections requires some guesswork and is not easily deployed on a large scale. TCP packets that carry HTTP responses or ACKs might be less likely to be spoofed. The presence of an encrypted channel only strengthens this assumption. Packets that can easily be dropped by the receiver and neither provoke a reply nor require action are not attractive for spoofing either. ICMP echo replies are an example for this category. Looking at the problem from the opposite direction, malformed packets that would disrupt communication are more likely to be spoofed than part of regular traffic. As part of this analysis we looked for packets that use port zero or the same destination and source address.
Our findings are summarized in Table 3 . They clearly indicate that for any selected cone more than 80 % of the packets carry a distinct characteristic of unspoofed traffic. We conclude that applying the method of spoofing detection at IXPs presented in [8] cannot be reproduced on a quantitative scale, and most likely leads to results dominated by false positives-and thus contradicts the original claims.
Pursuing further investigations and private communications with the authors, we tried to investigate the reasons for these dissappointing results. Aside from minor inaccuracies of the method such as (i) inaccurate timing and updates as well as (ii) disregards of BGP withdraw messages in the public dump files, and (iii) inaccurate modeling of transitivity in the BGP routing graph [15] , the construction of the customer cones always suffers severely from the lack of visibility of BGP relations. This well-known problem cannot be resolved on a general level. Instead, the authors of IMC'17 decided to manually inspect the traffic flows and adjust peering relations accordingly (cf., Section 4.4, "Missing AS Links:" in [8] ). Such manual adjustments of data sets are understandable for the individual case under exploration. They discard, however, the presented method from future use in real deployment.
CONCLUSION
Following a purely algorithmic approach, we could not reproduce the results of IMC'17. Instead, the majority of packets identified as "invalid" appeared as false positives. In trying to reproduce the paper Detection, Classification, and Analysis of Inter-Domain Traffic with Spoofed Source IP Addresses [8] , we found that the manual component of the methodology (i) represents the major challenge in terms of reproducability, and has (ii) a significant effect on the results; this highlights challenges in deploying approaches based on current methods in an automated fashion.
